Based on the Authentication mechanism, the Container provides Rundeck with a list of “group” or “role” names that the user belongs to. Rundeck uses this list to determine what access rights the user has. (For more about the role list, refer to Authenticating Users - Container authentication and authorization.)
A Rundeck access control policy grants users and user groups certain privileges to perform actions against rundeck resources like projects, jobs, nodes, commands and API. Every action requested by a user is evaluated by the Rundeck authorization system and logged for reporting and auditing purposes.
Since Rundeck respects the policy definition, you can define role-based authorization to restrict users to only a subset of actions. This enables a self-service type interface, where some users have access to a limited set of executable actions.
Two dimensions of information dictate authorization inside Rundeck:
The remainder of this section will describe how to use the access control policy.
Access to running or modifying Jobs is managed in an access control policy defined using the aclpolicy YAML document. This file contains a number of policy elements that describe what user group is allowed to perform which actions.
Please read over this document for information on how to define it, and how to grant access for certain actions to certain resources:
Policies can be organized into more than one file to help organize access by group or pattern of use. The normal Rundeck install will have generated a policy for the “admin” group. Not all users will need to be given “admin” access level to control and modify all Jobs. More typically, a group of users will be given access to just a subset of Jobs.
Rundeck loads ACL Policy definitions from these locations:
*.aclpolicy
files found in the rundeck etc
dir, which is either /etc/rundeck
(rpm and debian install defaults), or $RDECK_BASE/etc
(launcher/war configuration).The Rundeck server does not need to be restarted for changes to aclpolicy files to take effect.
The files are loaded at startup and are cached. When an authorization request occurs, the policies may be reloaded if the file was modified. A file’s contents are cached for at least 60 seconds before checking if they need to be reloaded. Also, the etc directory is only re-scanned for new/removed files after a 60 second delay.
If an authorization request occurs in the context of a specific Project (e.g. “does a user have Run access for a specific Job in this project?”) then the Project-level policies created via the API area also used to evaluate the authorization request.
Otherwise, only the policies on the filesystem, and uploaded to the System ACLs API are evaluated for the request.
Added in Rundeck 2.5, the rd-acl tool can help to create, test, and validate your policy files.
File listing: admin.aclpolicy example
description: Admin project level access control. Applies to resources within a specific project.
context:
project: '.*' # all projects
for:
resource:
- equals:
kind: job
allow: [create] # allow create jobs
- equals:
kind: node
allow: [read,create,update,refresh] # allow refresh node sources
- equals:
kind: event
allow: [read,create] # allow read/create events
adhoc:
- allow: [read,run,runAs,kill,killAs] # allow running/killing adhoc jobs
job:
- allow: [create,read,update,delete,run,runAs,kill,killAs] # allow create/read/write/delete/run/kill of all jobs
node:
- allow: [read,run] # allow read/run for nodes
by:
group: admin
---
description: Admin Application level access control, applies to creating/deleting projects, admin of user profiles, viewing projects and reading system information.
context:
application: 'rundeck'
for:
resource:
- equals:
kind: project
allow: [create] # allow create of projects
- equals:
kind: system
allow: [read,enable_executions,disable_executions,admin] # allow read of system info, enable/disable all executions
- equals:
kind: system_acl
allow: [read,create,update,delete,admin] # allow modifying system ACL files
- equals:
kind: user
allow: [admin] # allow modify user profiles
project:
- match:
name: '.*'
allow: [read,import,export,configure,delete,promote,admin] # allow full access of all projects or use 'admin'
project_acl:
- match:
name: '.*'
allow: [read,create,update,delete,admin] # allow modifying project-specific ACL files
storage:
- allow: [read,create,update,delete] # allow access for /ssh-key/* storage content
by:
group: admin
The example policy document above demonstrates the access granted to the users in group “admin”.
Both username
and group
can use regular expressions to match multiple users or groups.
Two separate policies define two levels of access control. The first is the “project” context, which allows access to actions on resources within a specific project. The second is the “application” level context, which allows access to things like creating projects, access to projects, managing users, and access to system information.
As described in the ACL Policy) definition, access is granted or denied to specific “resources”. Resources can take two forms:
For example, you might want to restrict access to a job or jobs within a certain group. This corresponds to specific “job” resources with a “group” property matching a certain pattern.
You might also want to restrict who can create new jobs. Since a new job does not exist yet, you cannot create a rule for this action to apply to an existing job. Which means this corresponds to a generic resource with a “kind” called “job”.
In Rundeck 2.8.x and later, Authentication Tokens are given a set of Authorization Roles at generation time, so the access levels for the Token depend on how it was generated.
See: API Token usage instructions.
See below: API Token Authorization.
(Note: In Rundeck 2.7.x and earlier, clients of the Web API may use the Token Authentication method. These clients are placed in the special authorization group called api_token_group
.)
Rundeck declares a number of actions that can be referenced inside the access control policy document.
The actions and resources are divided into project scope and application scope:
You define application scope rules in the aclpolicy, by declaring this context:
context:
application: 'rundeck'
These are the Application scope actions that can be allowed or denied via the aclpolicy:
create
action on a resource type with kind ‘project’)read
action on a resource type with kind ‘system’)read
create
update
delete
admin
disable_executions
action on a resource type with kind ‘system’)enable_executions
action on a resource type with kind ‘system’)disable_executions
action on a resource type with kind ‘system’)admin
action on a resource type with kind ‘system’)admin
action on a resource type of kind ‘user’)create
,update
,read
, or delete
action on a specific path within the storage ‘storage’ type)project
type)
read
delete
configure
import
export
delete_execution
promote
admin
project_acl
type)
read
create
update
delete
admin
apitoken
)
generate_user_token
generate_service_token
admin
apitoken
type)
create
read
install
uninstall
admin
The following table summarizes the generic and specific resources and the actions you can restrict in the application scope:
Type | Resource Kind | Properties | Actions | Description |
---|---|---|---|---|
resource |
project |
none | create |
Create a new project |
" | system |
none | read |
Read system information |
" | " | none | enable_executions |
Enable executions |
" | " | none | disable_executions |
Disable executions |
" | " | none | admin |
Enable or disable executions |
" | system_acl |
none | read |
Read system ACL policy files |
" | " | none | create |
Create system ACL policy files |
" | " | none | update |
Update system ACL policy files |
" | " | none | delete |
Delete system ACL policy files |
" | " | none | admin |
All access to system ACL policy files |
" | user |
none | admin |
Modify user profiles |
" | job |
none | admin |
Manage job schedules |
" | apitoken |
none | generate_user_token |
Create a “user” token |
" | " | none | generate_service_token |
Create a “service” token |
" | " | none | admin |
Full access |
" | plugin |
none | read |
List installed and available plugins |
" | " | none | install |
Install plugins |
" | " | none | uninstall |
Uninstall plugins |
" | " | none | admin |
Full access |
Type | Properties | Actions | Description |
---|---|---|---|
project |
“name” | read |
View a project in the project list |
" | " | configure |
View and modify project configuration |
" | " | delete |
Delete project |
" | " | import |
Import archive contents to the project |
" | " | export |
Export the project as an archive |
" | " | delete_execution |
Delete executions |
" | " | admin |
Full access to project |
project_acl |
“name” | read |
Read project ACL Policy files |
" | " | create |
Create project ACL Policy files |
" | " | update |
Update project ACL Policy files |
" | " | delete |
Delete project ACL Policy files |
" | " | admin |
All access to project ACL Policy files |
storage |
“path”,“name” | create |
Create files in the storage facility |
" | " | update |
Modify files in the storage facility |
" | " | read |
Read files and list directories in the storage facility |
" | " | delete |
Delete files in the storage facility |
apitoken |
“username”,“roles” | create |
Create an API Token with specified roles or username |
API Tokens can be generated if the user has the appropriate authorization on the apitoken
generic resource type.
This distinction allows administrators to let some users generate API Tokens which cannot increase their access levels (User Tokens), and other users to generate API Tokens with different access levels in a controlled way.
The authorizations levels are:
generate_user_token
: allows the user to generate a User Token.generate_service_token
: allows a user to generate a Service Token (see below).admin
: allows the user to generate a Token with any username and roles.Example to generate a User Token:
description: Allow "ops_team" members to generate User Tokens
for:
resource:
- equals:
kind: apitoken
allow: generate_user_token
context:
application: rundeck
by:
group: ops_team
To specify what roles and usernames are allowed for a Service Token, the user must also be authorized to create
an apitoken
resource type for a declared set of usernames and roles.
Example to generate a Service Token:
description: Allow "sec_ops" members to generate Service Tokens, for specific usernames and additional roles
for:
resource:
- equals:
kind: apitoken
allow: generate_service_token
apitoken:
- allow: create
match:
username: '(mysql|myservice)'
subset:
roles:
- mysql_api_access
- myservice_api_access
context:
application: rundeck
by:
group: sec_ops
Service Tokens implicitly allow a subset of the user’s own authorization roles and username (generate_service_token
implies generate_user_token
), so the usernames and roles authorized in the ACL Policy must specify any extra roles. When a Service Token is generated, any requested roles not already allowed by generate_user_token
will be checked against the ACL Policy. However, it is best to be explicit in the list of roles you want to allow.
Important:
The subset:
match for roles:
declares that extra roles for the Service Token may only come from this list, but doesn’t require the token to have all of the roles. (If you used contains:
it would be the inverse, and grant access only if the extra Service Token roles contained all of those in the roles:
list, i.e. a superset vs. a subset.)
You define project scope rules in the aclpolicy by declaring this context:
context:
project: "(regex)"
The regex can match all projects using ".*", or you can simply put the project name.
Note that for projects not matched by an aclpolicy, no actions will be granted to users.
Also note that to hide projects completely from users, you would need to grant or deny the “read” access to the project in the Application Scope.
These are the Project scope actions that can be allowed or denied via the aclpolicy:
The following table summarizes the generic and specific resources and the actions you can restrict in the project scope:
Type | Resource Kind | Actions | Description |
---|---|---|---|
resource |
job |
create |
Create a new Job |
" | " | delete |
Delete jobs |
" | " | scm_create |
Create a new job only using SCM import plugin |
" | " | scm_delete |
Delete jobs only using SCM import plugin |
" | node |
read |
Read node information |
" | " | create |
Create new node entries |
" | " | update |
Modify node entries |
" | " | refresh |
Refresh node entry from a URL |
" | event |
read |
Read history event information |
" | " | create |
Create arbitrary history event entries |
Type | Properties | Actions | Description |
---|---|---|---|
adhoc |
read |
Read adhoc execution output | |
" | run |
Run an adhoc execution | |
" | runAs |
Run an adhoc execution as another user | |
" | kill |
Kill an adhoc execution | |
" | killAs |
Kill an adhoc execution as another user | |
job |
“name”,“group”,“uuid” | read |
View a Job, its executions, and read its definition |
" | view |
View a Job and its executions | |
" | update |
Modify a job | |
" | delete |
Delete a job | |
" | run |
Run a job | |
" | runAs |
Run a job as another user | |
" | kill |
Kill a running job | |
" | killAs |
Kill a running job as another user | |
" | create |
Create the matching job | |
" | toggle_schedule |
Enable/disable the job’s schedule | |
" | toggle_execution |
Enable/disable the job for execution | |
" | scm_create |
Create a Job only using SCM import plugin | |
" | scm_update |
Import changes to a job using SCM import plugin | |
" | scm_delete |
Delete a job only using SCM import plugin | |
node |
“rundeck_server”, “nodename”, … | read |
View the node in the UI (see Node resource properties) |
" | run |
Run jobs/adhoc on the node |
Note: see Node resource properties for more node resource properties for authorization.
Note: Jobs can be referenced using “name” and “group” or using “uuid”.
Note: runAs
and killAs
actions only apply to certain API endpoints, and allow running jobs or adhoc executions or killing executions to be performed with a different username attached as the author of the action. See Rundeck API - Running a Job.
Note: Job deletion requires allowing the ‘delete’ action both at the generic type and specific resource levels.
Recall that defining rules for a generic resource type is done in this way:
Whereas defining rules for specific resources of a certain type is done in this way:
Or
The properties available are the attributes that are defined on the node, so you can apply authorizations based on tag, osName, hostname, etc. The special rundeck_server
property will be set to “true” for the Rundeck server node only, and “false” for all other nodes.
Any custom attributes can be used as well.
Name | Description |
---|---|
nodename |
Name of the node |
username |
Authentication username |
hostname |
Hostname of the node |
description |
Description of the node |
tags |
Set of tags. Can use with the contains: filter. |
osName |
Operating System name |
osFamily |
Operating System family, e.g. “unix” or “windows” |
osVersion |
Operating System version |
osArch |
Operating System architecture |
rundeck_server |
A value set to “true” if the node is the Rundeck server node |
Below is an example policy document demonstrating policy actions to create limited access for a group of users. Users in the group “restart_user”, are allowed to run three jobs in the “adm” group, Restart, stop and start. By allowing run
but not read
, the “stop” and “start” jobs will not be visible. Allowing view
for the ‘Restart’ job, but not read
, means that the users can view the job, but not its workflow definition, nor can they download the Job definition file.
File listing: restart_user.aclpolicy example
description: Limited user access for adm restart action
context:
project: '.*'
for:
job:
- equals:
group: 'adm'
name: 'Restart'
allow: [run,view]
- equals:
group: 'adm'
name: 'stop'
allow: [run]
- equals:
group: 'adm'
name: 'start'
allow: [run]
by:
group: [restart_user]
---
description: Limited user access for adm restart action.
context:
application: 'rundeck'
for:
resource:
- equals:
kind: system
allow: [read] # allow read of system info
project:
- match:
name: '.*'
allow: [read] # allow view of all projects
by:
group: [restart_user]
Below is an example policy to prevent any user on the “remote” group to execute any command or job on the local rundeck server.
If a job is tried to be executed locally, it will fail. Also, the local rundeck server will not appear on the node filter list.
File listing: remote.aclpolicy
description: Acess for users on remote group
context:
project: '.*'
for:
resource:
- allow: '*'
job:
- allow: '*'
adhoc:
- allow: '*'
node:
- equals:
rundeck_server: 'false'
allow: [read, run]
by:
group: remote
After defining an aclpolicy file to grant access to a particular group of users, you may find them getting “unauthorized” messages or complaints that certain actions are not possible.
To diagnose this, begin by checking two bits:
rundeck.audit.log
log file. The authorization facility generates fairly low level messages describing how the policy is matched to the user context.For each entry in the audit log, you’ll see all decisions leading up to either a AUTHORIZED or a REJECTED message. It’s not uncommon to see REJECTED messages followed by AUTHORIZED. The important thing is to look at the last decision made.